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Mobility in Rural Credit Markets: A Honduran Case Study 
Introduction 
In the 1990’s, much of Latin America underwent massive reforms aimed at liberalizing 
factor markets. These reforms were a response to low growth rates in the 1990’s, worsening of 
income distribution and rising poverty among the rural poor (Boucher et. al. 2002). It is well 
established in the literature that poverty reduction and general economic well-being can be 
achieved through better access to credit markets. This is because the poor, who are often liquidity 
constrained, need credit to finance their investment. The rural poor, however, often find 
themselves rationed out of the credit markets due to moral hazard, risk and adverse selection 
problems. 
Different institutions have developed different mechanisms in order to overcome moral 
hazard, adverse selection and other asymmetries. To the extent that different institutions offer 
different borrowers opportunities (contracts), the types of institutions accessible to borrower will 
influence the type of investment they make. This has been long recognized, and extensive 
literature exists that examines how households and lending institutions are matched. Most of this 
has not taken into account, however, the role of credit history. This gap in the literature can be 
explained by a lack of data. 
Recent theoretical and policy work has examined the determinants of a borrower’s ability 
to transition from one type of institution to another. This said, is it is not clear if individuals who 
have borrowed in the past are more likely to borrow in the future (and will have an easier time 
doing it) than those who have not participated (or not been able to participate) in the credit 
markets due to voluntary or forced rationing. The key issue is the difference between the 
likelihood of participation and the propensity to participate. Therefore, the important question to 
ask is does the ability to borrow depend on ones credit history (true state dependence) or is it the 
case that some individuals are inherently less likely to participate due to the presence of some 
unobserved characteristics (spurious state dependence)? This paper first explores the role of true   3
state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. Understanding the determinants of state 
dependence has important policy implications. 
There are two competing views about transitions in rural credit markets. The first is that a 
transition to formal institutions from an informal sector is a preferred outcome. The main reason 
is that the formal credit markets are regulated while the informal markets tend to be devoid of 
regulation and mainly consist of money lenders and traders who are more likely to offer 
exploitative contracts or charge high interest rates. In the formal sector, on the other hand, interest 
rates tend to be lower and loan size and terms of contracts are better. However, the formal sector 
has high collateral requirements. According to this view if a household borrows from an informal 
source it must be the case that the price of the loan (including transaction costs) or the formal 
sector collateral requirements are too high. That is, these households applied for formal sector 
loans that were denied or else knew they would be denied and did not even apply (Mushinski, 
1999)
 1. Once denied, these households turn to the other institutions namely informal sources to 
finance their investments, however exorbitant the terms of the contract. Hence, a transition from 
informal to formal is an efficient and desired outcome. 
 The second view sees the two sectors as substitutes because they offer distinctive 
contracts. That is, for some borrowers it is more efficient to borrow from the formal sector while 
others may find it advantageous to borrow from the informal. For example, a poor farmer who 
requires a short-term loan to buy seeds or fertilizer may find the collateral and administrative 
requirements of the formal sector to be prohibitive. A seasonal loan from the informal sector 
where history tends to be used as collateral may lower the risk or burden of poor households 
(Irfan, A and Ray. D & Ghosh, P). Households thus choose the sector that offers them the most 
lucrative contract for their specific requirement. In this view, borrowers are not thought of as 
transitioning to the formal sector from the informal sector or vice versa; their choice of which 
                                            
1It could also be the case that most rural poor households may choose to not enter the formal 
markets due viewing the process too complicated.   4
sector to participate in is just an matter of efficiency. Empirical studies, it must be added, suggest 
that in many cases loans from the formal sector are not possible for poor farmers and therefore 
they are forced to participate in the informal sector by default not choice. 
It should also be clear that these two views imply distinctive policy approaches. If policy 
makers believe that collateral requirements or transaction costs, for seasonal small loans, are the 
main deterrent to participation in formal credit markets, then offering smaller loans with low 
collateral requirements should increase participation of small borrowers. Transaction costs here 
could reflect complicated language or paper work needed to process loans as much as time spent 
pursuing the loans. Understanding the terms of the contract may be daunting to the relatively 
uneducated farmer. If poor landless farmers are unable to offer collateral for larger loans (to 
purchase land, for example) then using alternatives to collateral may be needed. For example, if 
credit history can serve as collateral, then investing in credit bureaus may be an policy alternative. 
Credit bureaus might then eliminate the moral hazard problem, and help to increase the volume of 
credit dispersed
2.  
The main contribution of this paper is to examine the importance of participation (or 
borrower) history in determining access to credit. A panel data set of rural Honduran households 
is used to study credit market transitions; specifically, the dynamic evolution of formal and 
informal sector participation. The evolution of the rural credit market in Honduras is made 
particularly interesting by the recent liberalization of rural credit and land markets that has 
emphasized less state involvement and more titling of land with the hope of improving credit 
access for the rural poor. Mobility patterns among four different credit market states are analyzed, 
namely those who have formal sector participation, informal sector participation, participation in 
both sectors and non-participation in rural credit markets. These patterns vary across different 
                                            
2 There is a vast literature that discusses the merits of credit bureaus. Some questions surrounding 
this are whether or not they are really needed and whether information on borrowers can be 
collected and verified. Credit bureaus are expensive to maintain. Furthermore, there is always the 
fear that credit bureaus will become political institutions. These issues although very relevant are 
not dealt with here.   5
departments and individuals during periods of both state involvement in financial markets and 
increased privatization of financial markets (Boucher et. al. 2002).  
An important finding in this paper is that taking into account unobserved heterogeneity 
‘true’ state dependence really matters. That is past choices of participation or non participation 
play a significant role in determining future credit access. Specifically, previous participation 
increases the likelihood of securing future loans. Further, the informal sector plays an important 
role for poor farmers in helping some of them to eventually obtain formal loans.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 has two main objectives. 
First it provides a brief description of the survey methodology and the socio economic context of 
the research site. Second, it describes the structure of rural credit markets including entry and exit 
in to credit markets and the general terms of contracts in both the formal and informal sectors. I 
present descriptive statistics on the size of the four sectors in each year and on the transition 
probabilities. The econometric model is discussed in Section 3. I use a reduced form dynamic 
multinomial logit model for panel data with random effects, explaining credit market 
participation for each individual in each time period. The model is a variation of the Markov 
models proposed in Heckman (1981a) and Magnac (2001), true state dependence and 
heterogeneity is distinguished by including dummies for one period lagged credit market state, as 
well as unobserved individual random effects.  
The estimation results are presented in Section 4. In order to interpret the meaning of 
parameter estimates, I use the model to simulate transition probabilities for the groups with 
various background characteristics. Finally, Section 5 reviews the main contributions of this 
paper and emphasizes the need for further research on the dynamic nature of credit markets.  
 
Section 2: Data Description  
The panel dataset used in the analysis is constructed from four waves of data collection 
by three research teams. It follows land and 450 rural households from four departments in rural   6
Honduras: Ocotopeque, Santa Barbara, Comayagua and Yoro.  The baseline study was conducted 
by the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin in 1983-84 for two of the four 
departments and then in 1988-89 by the same research team from two other departments. Of the 
original sample, Ramón Lopez and the World Bank team re-surveyed 450 households in 1994. 
The last wave was in the spring of 2001 as part of a project funded by the European Community, 
U.S. AID, and the World Bank.   
The original sample was designed to capture the variation in land distribution. The 
households were chosen from a list of land parcels prepared by the government for a titling 
program and they were chosen from this list to ensure representation of all farm sizes
3. This 
sample was aimed at evaluating the impact of titling program during the 1980’s in the coffee 
growing regions of rural Honduras. Furthermore, to be part of this sample, households needed to 
either to have 5 hectares of land or to dedicate 1 hectare of land for coffee. Because of the dearth 
of very small farms and landless households, the full land distribution in these four departments 
are not represented. Consequently, this data set tends to undercount rural households without land 
(or small holdings) and households with large holdings. Table 1 provides evidence to support the 
claim above. In all four periods there are no landless households. Over half of the households 
have less than 10 manzanas of land and approximately 42 percent of the households have greater 
than 10 manzanas of land. It is interesting to note that the distribution of land among these 
households has remained fairly stable over the 1984-2000 time period.  
   Although there is some attrition in terms of individuals within the data , the main 
weakness of this dataset is that the first two waves of the data included only limited information 
in terms of credit access. The newer waves of data collection evolved to include more information 
pertaining to household choices and farming decisions. The strength of this dataset is the fact that 
it tracks households involved with these parcels over time. This gives us some insights into the 
                                            
3 For more details on the sampling methods see Barham et al. (2002) and Selisgson et al. (1983), 
Nesman and Seligson (1988), and Seligson and Nesman (1989)   7
dynamics of household decisions, albeit not comprehensive, over the same time span. While the 
information on land is the focus of this dataset, there is information on credit market participation 
for all four periods. 
Apart from the availability of data for multiple time periods Honduras makes an 
interesting case study for studying credit market participation for two reasons. First, state 
involvement in financial markets was really high in the 1980’s (Larson et al., 1999). This meant 
the main source of credit was either governmental or friends and family. Second, in 1992 
Honduras passed a land reform package called Law of Agricultural Modernization and 
Development of the Agricultural Sector (LMDSA). The focus of LMDSA was to improve 
property rights, activate land rental markets and deepen titling initiatives. It simultaneously 
encouraged privatization of rural financial markets and liberalized rural interest rates (Boucher et 
al. 2002). Thus, examining the Honduran case will provide valuable insights about the transition 
to institutional credit or away from it post liberalization. 
Table 1. Land Distribution by Year 
Year  1984 1988 1994 2000 
Land Owned in manzanas  n=444  n=436  n=526  n=522 
0mz  - - -  1.71 
0-2 mz  27.25  24.77  19.58  26.43 
2-5mz 17.34  20.18  17.87  16.16 
5-10mz 15.54  17.89  17.3  13.31 
10-20mz 16.44  12.84  19.01  15.59 
20-50mz 14.41  15.6  16.16  14.45 
>50mz 9.01  8.49  10.08  12.36 
 
Table 2 shows the extent of participation of sample households in credit markets in the 
four periods. The formal sector is comprised of commercial, state and traditional banks. The 
informal sector includes all non-institutional lenders, private lenders and family/friends. 
Participation is widespread in all four periods. Over 70 percent did not participate in the credit 
markets prior to reforms and about 50 percent did not participate post reforms. About 20 percent 
participated in the formal sector prior to reforms and post reforms. Perhaps the most striking   8
feature is the post reforms increase in participation that was experienced by the informal sector 
rather than the formal sector. Titling reforms seem to not have affected access to agricultural 
credit in the formal sector. This could be explained in part by the downsizing of BANADESA, 
the main state development bank, has at best been counteracted by more loans from other formal 
sources. One such source is BANCAFE which is quazi-public. Furthermore, institutional credit 
actually saw a decline in the number of borrowers. This can be explained in part by the 
emergence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) extending credit to rural households
4.  
  For participating individuals, the contractual terms, and collateral requirements across the 
formal and informal sector, (see Tables A1. and A2. in appendix A), the mean loan size in the 
formal sector is much higher than loans in the informal sector. In addition the average length of 
contracts is much higher in the formal sector. The formal sector requires collateral for 90 percent 
of loans of which  45 percent are land-based whilst only 42 percent of the loans in the informal 
sector require collateral of any kind. The data further shows that small farmers tend to borrow 
more short term loans with a mean size of 300 – 1000 Lempiras as compared to 1000 – 6000 by 
larger farmers. 
Table 2. Participation in Rural Credit Markets by Year 
 Year  1984  1988  1994  2000 
 Sector  n=444  n=436  n=526  n=522 
No participation  78.83  75.92  70.53  50.96 
Loan from Institution  17.57  22.71  19.01  12.84 
Loan from Informal Sector  2.7  1.15  9.13  25.29 
Loan from both  0.9  0.23  1.33  10.92 
Total 100  100  100  100 
 
A summary of credit market transitions from 1983-2000 can be estimated by simple 
descriptive methodology. These estimates are presented below in the form of transition 
probabilities when the transition process is homogeneous Markov. The estimated transition 
                                            
4 For the purposes of this analysis NGO’s are included in the informal category, though these are 
really only evident in the 2000 data. The previous studies do not make much mention of NGO’s. 
The 2000 survey was more comprehensive and may have somewhat more complete reporting.   9
probability from state i to state j is pij=nij/nj where nij is the total number of transitions from i to j 
(Magnac, 2000). The results shown in Tables 3 and 4 establish that the ability to secure a loan in 
the future is affected by past participation. These tables also emphasize the importance of the 
informal sector for the poor households. For example, an equal number of non-participants access 
the informal sector as the formal and 30 percent of previous informal sector participants borrow 
from the informal sector again. 
More importantly, 17 percent of the households with previous loans in the informal sector 
were able to secure loans from the formal sector. Interestingly households that used both sectors 
in the past, borrowed either from formal or both sectors again but did not borrow from the 
informal sector exclusively.  Households that have formal loans in their past continue to borrow 
from the formal sector. These results suggest that some form of hierarchy in which informal loans 
can be viewed as a stepping-stone to formal loans. While, having a formal loan might also help to 
secure informal loans the data does not point towards movement in that direction (only 9 percent 
turned to loans in the informal sector exclusively as compared to 37 percent that stayed with 
formal loans). The transition probabilities in the tables below show an informal loan is more 
likely to lead to a formal loan than a formal loan is to lead to an informal loan.  
Table 3 Transition Probabilities for the full sample (no heterogeneity) 
Final state → 
Initial State↓ Non  Participation  Formal  Informal  Both 
Non Participation  71%  13%  13%  3% 
Formal 45%  38%  9%  9% 
Informal 45%  17%  31%  6% 
Both 58%  17%  0  25% 
 
Table 4 Transition Probabilities where initial state=1994 (no heterogeneity)   
Final state 2000 → 
Initial State 1994↓ Non  Participation  Formal  Informal  Both 
Non Participation  55%  10%  27%  7% 
Formal 44%  20%  12%  23% 
Informal 34%  17%  40%  9% 
Both 43%  14%  0  43% 
   10
It is interesting to compare the transition probabilities for the years 1994 and 2000 
because the LMDSA was implemented in 1993. Comparing the pre-reform to the post reform era 
reinforces the findings for the full sample. In addition, new borrowers were almost entirely 
absorbed by the informal sector. This suggests that in the post-liberalization era the informal 
sector has become an even more important source of credit for poor farmers. 
 
Section 3: Econometric Methodology 
Let me begin with a conceptual framework for understanding credit market participation. 
For the sake of clarity, participation is broken down into four observational regimes (1) Non 
participation-that is no loans from either formal or informal sources; (2) Formal- loans only from 
formal lenders; (3) Informal– loans from informal lenders; (4) Both– loans from both formal and 
informal lenders.  
It is important to note that two types of individuals belong to the non-participation 
regime. The first type of individual has the ability to self-finance and is therefore unwilling to 
borrow at the going rate (their demand for loans equals 0). The second type of individual is one 
that would be willing to borrow and could not (their demand for loans are positive). Clearly, 
which type of individual you are shapes your future choices as well. My ability to model these 
two types of non-borrowers is limited by the lack of data in the earlier round of the panel. This 
means I cannot make meaningful inferences about individuals in the non-participation regime 
using transition probabilities
5. Nevertheless, there are many interesting insights to be gained from 
studying transitions to other states. 
For a more systematic examination of dynamics of participation in credit markets a multi-
variate analysis is needed. The approach taken is to use a dynamic multinomial logit panel data 
model with random effects to predict the probability that farmers with different characteristics 
                                            
5 analysis is currently underway for deeper analysis of non-participants for the 1994 and 2000 
rounds of the panel.   11
make transition to different states. This model is similar to the first order Markov model 
presented in Honoré (2001) and Gong (2000). The model distinguishes between ‘true’ and 
‘spurious’ state dependence by including lagged state dummy variables as the explanatory 
variables and individual effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The individual effects 
are assumed to be independent of unobserved characteristics and follow a multivariate normal 
distribution. 
The specification of the model is as follows, let Y be the categorical variable which 
represents the observed state, assume individuals i (=1,…,n) can be in any of the j possible states 
at time t. Yijt can be considered as the unobservable propensity of the individual to be in state j at 
time t and is modeled as a linear combination of an individual’s characteristics. Throughout the 
paper, I will use J=4: participating in the formal sector (j=1), participating in the informal sector 
(j=2), participation in both sectors (j=3) and non participation (j=4). The utility derived from state 
j (j= 1,2,3,4) in period t>1 is specified as 
  Y ijt = Xit’βj + Zitγj + αij + εijt       1  
Where Xit is a vector of explanatory variables which includes total land owned, farm and 
off farm income, age of the household head, education of the head of the household etc. The 
vector Zit is comprised of lagged participation state. Here non participation is taken as the 
reference state. αij is the random effect component reflecting time constant unobserved 
heterogeneity. To identify this  β1, γ1, αi1 are normalized to zero. The parameters to be estimated 
are then βj and γj. The εijt are i.i.d error terms. They are assumed to have a Type I extreme value 
distribution and independent of Xit, and αij . Hence, the probability for individual i to be in state j 
at time t>1, given characteristics Xit, random effects αij’s,  and lagged dummy states , can be 
written as 
  
P(j| Xit,Zit, αi1,...,αiJ) =
exp(Xit
' bj + Zit
' γj)
exp(Xit





   2   12
Define αi = (αi2,..,αiJ). Assume that the αi’s follow a multivariate normal distribution. Put 
differently, the αij’s are specified as linear combinations of J-1 independent N(0,1) variables: 
  αi==Aηi , with ηi ~ NJ-1(0,IJ-1)       3  
where A= J-1×J-1 is a lower triangular parameter matrix to be estimated. The covariance matrix 
of αi is then given by Σα=AA’ (Frees, J 2003 and Baltagi 2002). For period t=1 a static 
multinomial logit model with different parameter slopes
6 is used without including the lag. This 
model can be viewed as a linear approximation to the reduced form that would be obtained if the 
lagged dependent variables were replaced by their specifications according to the dynamic model 
for periods earlier than t=1. The model can be estimated by using Maximum Likelihood. If the 
random effects αi were observed, the likelihood contribution of the ith individual in observed 
states j1,..,jT is given by 
Li(ηi) = P(j1| Xi1, αi)P(j2|Xi2, Zi2, αi)… P(jT|XiT, ZiT,αi)   4 
The above equation is relatively straightforward to compute. It is simply a sequence of 
multinomial logit probabilities. Since the individual effects are unobserved the likelihood 
contribution is given by the expectation of  equation 4 such that: 
 









1  2  3 
Li(ηi)ϕ(ηi)dηi2...dηiJ     5  
where ϕη i ( ) is the joint density of ηi. Computation of the likelihood contribution in equation 5 
involves J-1 dimensional integration. In my case J=4, and various numerical techniques exist to 
approximate the integral. 
The variables used in the estimation process need description, beginning with the loan 
categories . First, due to the limited number of observations in the semiformal credit markets, the 
informal and semiformal sectors were collapsed into one category. Farmers who received loans, 
                                            
6 The static model is given by Yij1=Xi1’πj + θij + εij1. Where θij captures the random effects 
component and can be defined as a function of αij.    13
in any of the four periods, exclusively from institutional sources were labeled as participating in 
the formal sector. Farmers who borrowed only from any other source were placed in the informal 
category. Farmers who borrowed from both institutional and other sources were placed in the 
both category. A summary of the independent variables is available in Appendix A. A 
household’s participation in the credit market depends on the amount of collaterizable wealth 
they possess. For this reason land owned, value of livestock and a dummy variable SomeTitle 
(indicates if the household has any land that is titled) is included. The variable SomeTitle is used 
instead of area of titled land because this information does not exist for all waves of the panel. 
Livestock is included in the regression because it is used as collateral in the informal sector. 
Income generated from farming and non-farming activities are also included in the regression 
because they serve as a proxy for the amount of liquidity the households possess. It is important 
to note that there may be an endogeneity issue here. For example, unobserved individual 
characteristics like inherent farming ability can generate biased estimates. The follow up to this 
paper will explicitly deal with this issue 
  The non-wealth variables are included in the regression to control for individual 
heterogeneity. The age of the household head serves as a proxy for experience. Education of the 
household head serves two purposes namely: highly educated farmers may be more likely to 
participate in the formal sector, because they are better able to process the loan applications, or 
well educated farmers may be more productive. Finally, higher levels of education may also 
imply higher social status which may result in easier access to credit in the formal sector. This 
suggests that farmers with high education should be positively correlated with participation in the 
formal sector.  
  The number of household members is also included in the regression because a larger 
number of dependents may imply a greater need to borrow. The expected sign of the regression 
can go either way depending on the relative wealth status of the household. Regional dummies 
are included to capture unobserved regional variation. Finally, a lag variable is included in the   14
regression. The lag variable serves to determine the role history plays in future participation in 
credit markets. 
 
Section 4: Econometric Results  
The results of the dynamic multinomial regression can be found in Appendix A. As 
described above, the parameters of the vector βj in the multinomial regression framework 
describe the impact of individual characteristics on the probability of an individual i being 
observed in state j at time t relative the base category (non participation). Following Honoré this 
relative probability is given by: 
  
P(yit = j|y it−1 = k;β,α)
P(yit = 0|y it−1 = k;β,α)
P(yit = j|y it−1 = 0;β,α)
P(yit = 0|y it−1 = 0;β,α)
= e
βkj−β0j     6  
 Normalizing    β0j =0, means that a positive sign on parameter βj and γj (j=2,3,4) means, 
that the corresponding variable has a positive impact on the probability to be in state j compared 
to the probability to be in the non participation state (the reference state).  
Three models are estimated. The first is the static multinomial model for time t=1, where 
the independent variables only represent individual characteristic (Xj’s). The second is a pooled 
multinomial logit model with time dummies. The last is a dynamic multinomial logit with lagged 
states. The point estimates for all three models are presented in the appendix in Tables A.5.-A.7 
respectively.  
According to the pooled model, the total amount of land owned plays a significant role in 
one’s ability to get formal loans. This makes sense because in the formal sector 90 percent of the 
loans are secured with some form of collateral and of those loans 45 percent required land as 
collateral. Furthermore, in the formal sector women are less likely to get a formal loan as 
compared to men. This seems to be true for participation in both formal or informal sectors 
though significant only in the formal sector. The inability of female household heads to acquire   15
loans is in line with recent findings. There are many reasons for this. Among them, in many 
societies women do not have access to titled land thereby reducing their ability to collateralize 
loans. Furthermore, in order to get a loan women may be required to have  their male relatives 
guarantee the loan and men may be unwilling to do this for societal reasons (Fletchner, 2003). 
They also may not have similar levels of “demand” for loans. Without further analysis it is hard 
to pin point the exact source of bias against female headed households.  
Age also seems to be significant in getting loans from the informal sector, but not in the 
formal sector. This may be due to the fact that the longer you live in the community the more 
trust and reputation you have established. Therefore, informal lenders are more likely to loan to 
you. In the formal sector the level of education acquired by the household head seems to 
significantly improve the ability to get loans. Once again, this is in accordance with the literature. 
Rural farmers often do not apply to loans from the formal sector because they find the loan 
application process intimidating and have difficulty understanding the application due to their 
lack of education. In addition, it may be the case that only wealthy farmers are well educated and 
can use their wealth as collateral thereby getting formal loans more frequently. It is interesting to 
note that the informal sector does not stress education as a condition for obtaining a loan whereas 
education increases the likelihood of securing a loan in the formal sector.  
Whether or not a household has formally titled land significantly impacts the likelihood 
of households to get formal loans. This is not surprising, because the majority of loans dispersed 
in the formal sector are use land as collateral. The regional dummies seem to be insignificant in 
terms of increasing the likelihood of getting loans from the formal sector. Santa Barbara seems 
significant in terms of acquiring loans from the informal sector. The time dummies are 
significant; indicating that choices in the previous periods do effect current choices. 
The results of the dynamic multinomial model indicate that the same variables are 
significant in both models. The dynamic model picks up strong regional variation. If you live in 
Santa Barbara or Comayagua and Yoro, you are less likely to get loans from the formal sector.   16
The lag state is significant which means one’s choice of previous participation strongly impacts 
the future participation decision. An individual with loans from the formal sector is more likely to 
get loans from the formal sector in the future. Further if a household has borrowed from an 
informal source in the past there are also more likely to secure a loan from the formal sector in 
the future. This re-emphasizes the findings in Section 2 that informal loans seem to be a stepping 
stone for many rural farmers. Having a loan from formal source in the past impacts the ability to 
secure a future loan in the informal sector but as pointed out in Section 2 there does not seem to 
be substantial movement in that direction. 
Table 5. Effect of Lagged states on transition probabilities for Households with less than 10mz of 
land) 
Final state 2000 → 
Initial State↓  Non Participation  Formal  Informal 
Non Participation  75%  16%  9% 
Formal 44%  39%  17% 
Informal 58%  28%  14% 
Both 37%  46%  17% 
 
Next we turn to analyze the participation of households with less than 10 manzanas (mz.) 
of land. The transition probabilities presented in Tables 5  represent the mean household with less 
than 10 mz. of land. Further, these transition probabilities unlike ones presented in Section 2 
account for unobserved heterogeneity. As pointed out before, due to the presence of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity the lagged state variables and random terms are not independent. The 
dynamic multinomial logit model with random effects yields consistent and efficient estimates. 
The transition probabilities are computed from the estimates as conditional probabilities – given 
the individual characteristics as well as lagged participation state.  
Several things are worth pointing out. First, 16 percent of new entrants approach formal 
sector directly as compared to 9 percent in the informal sector. Second, starting with a history of 
loans from the formal sector  helps secure a formal loan in the future for 40 percent of small 
farmers. Note nobody makes transition to both sectors. People either find themselves in the   17
formal or informal sectors. For small farmers the link between formal and informal sector seems 
really emphasized. Previous loans from either sector greatly increases participation in the formal 
sector as compared to the informal sector. This once again provides strong support to the 
hypothesis that at least some small farmers use informal credit as a stepping stone to formal 
credit. Further, previous borrowing has a definite impact on both ability to secure a loan and the 
ability to transition from informal to formal sector. 
The next step in understanding the effects of lagged states and individual heterogeneity 
on the likelihood of participation in credit markets is to examine the estimated probabilities by 
land and wealth components. To examine this relationship more completely the predicted 
probabilities conditional on participation state in the previous period were plotted. Figures 1a 
through 1d display the magnitude of wealth bias participation choice conditional on choice in 
previous period.  The plots have been drawn holding all values (except land) at their mean levels. 
While this process tends to overstate the participation of poor farmers it allows an assessment of 
the impact of land ownership on participation. Figure 1a shows, conditional on the participation 
state of the previous period, that land increases the probability of non-participation and the 
probability of accessing institutional credit increases. This captures two important points: first as 
land increases farmers may be less likely to need to loans to finance investments. Second, as land 
increases the probability of gaining access to formal loans increases because land may be used as 
collateral. Relatedly, as land increases the probability that a farmer seeks an informal loan 
decreases.  
Plotting holding all values (expect wealth) at their mean levels shows this relationship 
more clearly (see Figures 2a through 2d). As wealth increases the probability of participation 
decreases regardless of the participation choice in the previous period. Furthermore, as wealth 
increases the probability of participation in the formal sector increases more dramatically if a 
farmer has either never participated or if they have had access to institutional credit. The lower   18
two panels show that if a farmers history involves informal loans then the transition to formal 
credit increases less dramatically than starting from other states. 
Section 5: Conclusions 
In this paper, I have explored the question of whether state dependence and unobserved 
individual heterogeneity matter in rural Honduran credit markets. I have done so by studying the 
transition patterns among four credit market states; formal sector loans, informal sector loans, 
informal and formal sector loans and no loans. The main findings are that ‘true’ state dependence 
plays a significant role in ones ability to borrow. That is to say that the lag credit participation 
choice needs to enter the model in a structural way as an explanatory variable. The extent to 
which unobserved heterogeneity matters has been unresolved in this paper. However, further 
analysis is underway. 
Further this paper also emphasizes the importance of time varying individual 
characteristics. For example, the probability of participating in the formal sector increases with 
education, age, sex, land size, and titling status of land owned. These same variables do not seem 
to impact access to informal sector credit. This is to say observed individual heterogeneity 
matters in case of access to formal sector loans. The simulated transition probabilities in different 
market conditions and for different individuals in the same period were compared. Overall 
transition rates to the formal sector are higher than transition rates to the informal sector. For a 
poor farmer with loans from the formal or informal sector increases the likelihood of securing a 
future formal loan by roughly 35 percent. There definitely is some upward mobility among 
sectors. The informal sector may serve small farmers as an important stepping-stone in terms of 
access to formal credit. In addition, since having secured a previous loan is an important step for 
future credit access especially among smaller-scale farmers, it seems that policies that promote 
small trial loans with low collateral and have low transaction costs but require repayment could 
have long run effects on credit access from other institutions.    19
Some limitations of my approach and directions for future research seem worth 
mentioning. The first is that my model uses a reduced form in the sense that loan terms and or 
interest rates are not explicitly modeled. An extension would be to use a more structural model in 
which implicit interest rates in both sectors are modeled simultaneously with credit market state. 
This type of model would allow me to explore how the interest rates differential between the two 
sectors affects participation. Another limitation of this model is the that I did not distinguish 
between non-participants. Clearly, making that distinction is imperative and needs further 
consideration.    20
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Appendix 
A.1. Table Summary of Loan Terms by Participation State 
Sector Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Formal Loans        
Loan Size  17681  49029  120  460000 
Average Loan Size  8698  30164  40  250000 
Average Interest rate  9  8  0  42 
Average Length of Contract  9  10  0  48 
Informal Loans        
Loan Size  6677  26996  0  245000 
Average Loan Size  6380  28916  0  245000 
Average Interest rate  4  7  0  38 
Average Length of Contract  3  10  0  58 
Both Formal and Informal Loans        
Loan Size  27437  46512  500  174373 
Average Loan Size  14672  25121  167  86667 
Average Interest rate  8  7  0  22 
Average Length of Contract  4  5  0  18 
 
 
Table A.2. Type of Collateral Required by Source of Loan 
Collateral type  Formal (n=316) Informal (n=197)  Both (n=67) 
Land   47%  7%  54% 
Other 42%  35%  37% 
None 11%  55%  9% 
 
 
Table A.3. Summary of Individual Characteristics 
Characteristic Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
On Farm Income Lempiras  5,846  49,110  -601,8  1,030,0 
Value of Livestock  19,781  154,815  0  6,046 
Off Farm Income Lempiras  1,765  12,294  0  324,000 
Land Owned  23  68  0  1852 
Sex of Household Head  0.84  0.58  0  1 
Age of Household Head  52  28.18  0  95 
Education of Household head  2.48  2.83  0  20 
Number of members in the 
Household 7  3.55  0  55 
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Table. A.4. Description of the variables 
Variables Description 
Own  The total amount of land owned by households in manzanas 
Sometitle  Households with some land with formal title 
HH_edu  Education for the household head 
HH_age  Age of the household head 
HH_members  Number of members in the household 
T_2 Land  owned  squared 
W_2 Wealth  squared 
Comay  Regional dummy for Comayagua 
Yoro  Regional dummy for Yoro 
Ocot  Regional dummy for Ocotopeque 
Santa  Regional dummy for Santa Barbara 
T1  Time dummy: 1 if year is 1984 
T2  Time dummy: 1 if year is 1988 
T3  Time dummy: 1 if year is 1994 
Formal  Participation in the formal credit sector 
Informal  Participation in the Informal credit sector 
Both  Participation in both formal and informal credit sectors 
 
 





























 Formal  Informal  Both 
Own 0.01  0.01  0.005 
 (0.00)*  (0.01)  (0.01) 
wealth  0.17 0.53 0.89 
 (0.074)*  (0.26)*  (0.47) 
HH_sex -0.84  0.46  -44.26 
 (0.48)  (0.95)  (0) 
HH_age -0.01  -0.12  0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.04)**  (0.05) 
HH_edu 0.15  0.06  0.1 
 (0.05)**  (0.14)  (0.21) 
HH_members  0.01 0.22 0.01 
 -0.05  -0.14  (0.19) 
santa 0.35  18.23  20.5 
 -0.6  (2.46)**  (5.04)** 
comoy 1.08  19.78  21.13 
 -0.59  (2.29)**  (5.10)** 
yoro 1.59  -25  -21.52 
 (0.65)*  0  (0) 
Constant -3.65  -23.98  -34.01 
 (0.99)**  0  (0) 
Observations  407 407 407 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   24
Table A. 6. Pooled Multinomial Logit Model Coefficient estimates 
 Formal  Informal  Both 
Own 0.004  -0.0017  0.01 
 (0.002)*  (0.005)  (0.003)** 
wealth 2.67e-06  -1.60e-06  2.02e-06 
 (2.09e-6)  (0.00001)  (2.55e-06) 
HH_sex  -1.13 -0.39 -0.46 
 (0.30)**  (0.46)  (0.74) 
HH_age 0.0037  -0.03  0.01 
 (-0.006)  (0.01)**  (0.02) 
HH_edu  0.17 0.11 0.27 
 (0.04)**  (0.06)  (0.06)** 
HH_members  0.08 0.07 0.14 
 (0.03)**  (0.04)  (0.07)* 
Sometitle 2.14  0.33  24.21 
 (0.35)**  (0.34)  (1.51)** 
santa -0.4  -0.89  -1 
  (0.29) (0.44)* (0.52) 
comoy 0.21  -0.3  -1.32 
 (0.29)  (0.4)  (0.55)* 
yoro 0.16  0.34  -1.72 
  (0.37) (0.48) (1.17) 
T1  -29.67 -30.47 -32.09 
  (1.11)** (1.06)** (1.22)** 
T2  -29.26 -31.95 -70.89 
 (1.11)**  0  (37.12) 
T3  -28.87 -28.63 -31.09 
  (1.11)** (1.05)** (1.21)** 
Constant 24.96  27.97  2.24 
 (1.25)**  (1.32)**  0 
Observations  1183 1183 1183 
Standard errors in parentheses   
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Table A.7. Dynamic Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates 
 Formal  Informal  Both 
Constant -4.155  -0.697  -26.031 
 (0.764)**  (0.929)  (1.205)** 
Own 0.0002  -0.014  0.04 
 (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.015)** 
wealth 0.000006  0.000040  0.000009 
 (0.00001)  (0.00003)  0 
T_2 0  0.000024  -0.000187 
 0  (0.00003)  (0.000)* 
W_2 0  0  0.000000 
 0  0  (0.000) 
HH_sex -1.382  -0.96  -0.368 
 (0.418)**  (0.544)  (0.733) 
HH_age 0.015  -0.019  0.011 
 (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.017) 
HH_edu 0.206  0.104  0.411 
 (0.051)**  (0.076)  (0.075)** 
HH_members 0.163 0.081 0.392 
 (0.038)**  (0.051)  (0.077)** 
Sometit 1.961  -0.099  20.49 
 (0.348)**  (0.333)  0 
santa -1.467  -1.31  -3.014 
 (0.388)**  (0.491)**  (0.606)** 
comoy -1.067  -1.478  -4.073 
 (0.360)**  (0.447)**  (0.635)** 
yoro -1.546  -0.673  -4.428 
 (0.500)**  (0.502)  (1.247)** 
Formal 1.544  0.856  2.075 
 (0.254)**  (0.388)*  (0.479)** 
Informal 0.954  0.579  0.899 
 (0.574)  (0.852)  (1.153) 
Both -0.254  -29.977  -2.47 
 (1.49)  (38.405)  (2.259) 
Observations    
Standard errors in parentheses   
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Figure 1d. Estimated probabilities